Free French Bombers Over France

During the Second World War the Allies waged a bombing campaign over occupied France that cost the lives of more than 57,000 civilians. As the raids intensified in 1944 they provoked a fierce backlash from the French population. Among the bombers, however, were French squadrons who were compelled to accept civilian losses as unfortunate, but inevitable, ‘collateral damage’.

After the fall of France in June 1940 the British government and General Charles de Gaulle established the Free French Air Forces under RAF command. However, it was only after the Allies liberated north Africa in early 1943 that significant numbers of the nation’s airmen were able to join the newly reconfigured French Air Force. French fighter and bomber squadrons that had been based in north Africa moved to RAF bases in Britain.

To prepare the way for the D-Day landings, in April 1944 the Allies embarked upon the Transportation Plan, strategically bombing French railway lines, bridges and marshalling yards. From the outset, however, the Plan was hugely contentious, claiming the lives of 16,000 French civilians and incurring the opposition of Winston Churchill, the British war cabinet and commander-in-chief of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris. Writing to Franklin D. Roosevelt on 7 May 1944 Churchill raised significant ethical concerns about bombing targets in populated areas, warning that ‘the slaughter is among friendly people who have committed no crimes against us’. The president conceded that the losses were ‘regrettable’, but maintained that he was ‘not prepared to impose from this distance any restriction on military action’ that might ‘militate against the success of [Operation] Overlord or cause additional loss of life to our Allied Forces of invasion’.

The Free French, meanwhile, were caught between wanting to see their country liberated and deploring the significant loss of life. In France itself, public opinion turned increasingly hostile. Members of the Resistance reported that the bombing of Marseille, which caused 1,750 civilian deaths, had triggered an ‘inextinguishable hatred’ of the Americans and British. Across the nation, people began to feel that they were being treated as enemies, rather than allies.

For French airmen, the Transportation Plan posed particular moral dilemmas because it meant bombing their own country. The RAF offered them the opportunity to request replacements if they felt unable to undertake the raids, but, accepting the strategic need, none ever did. Some even felt that they had a duty to uphold their nation’s honour after the humiliation of the defeat of 1940. Nevertheless, as they flew over France the men witnessed towns being set ablaze by Allied bombs and feared for the safety of their families. Interviewed by Yorkshire Air Museum in 2008 André Guedez, an upper gunner with the Tunisie squadron, maintained that he was proud of having accomplished the mission with which he had been tasked. However, Louis Bourgain, who served with the Guyenne squadron, admitted in the 1990s that while excited to participate in the liberation of his nation, he had also felt a sense of ‘oppression’ at having to bomb his native soil.

The French bomber squadrons earned a reputation for accuracy, often risking their own safety: where possible, they flew at low altitudes to minimise civilian casualties. As a result, they were called upon to undertake some of the most dangerous raids. Such was the case in May 1944. The operation involved striking a railway depot where 21 locomotives hidden by the Germans had been discovered by the Resistance. Measuring just 100 square metres, the target was located next to the Tourcoing-Roubaix conurbation near Lille, inhabited by around a million people. General Martial Valin later recounted the painful predicament that he and other members of the Lorraine squadron encountered before the raid and the crisis of conscience they experienced afterwards. Adverse weather conditions made it difficult to identify the target. On returning from the raid, the airmen became racked by guilt and anxiety, fearing that they had inadvertently bombed residential areas and killed hundreds of civilians. Their torment grew when radio broadcasts in occupied France denounced them as ‘ogres’. Only when Allied photographs confirmed that the target had been hit and that civilian losses had been limited to eight did the airmen feel that they could have a clear conscience.

Far from being lauded for their actions, however, the French bomber squadrons found that they were viewed with suspicion by their own leaders during the war and were largely forgotten in the period thereafter. The French authorities in London saw the airmen as latecomers and ‘fake’ Free Frenchmen. De Gaulle accused them of supporting his rival General Giraud, under whom they had served in north Africa, and whom the US government had wanted as Free French leader instead of de Gaulle. Their officers were not welcome at the headquarters of the French Air Force in London, either.

After the war many pilots felt that their sacrifices were overlooked by an ungrateful nation. While de Gaulle sought to create an image of the French people freeing themselves from occupation, proclaiming on 25 August 1944 that Paris was ‘Liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help of the armies of France’, the French bomber squadrons were never part of the narrative. Eighty years on, few in France know about the role played by French airmen in the liberation of their country.

Karine Varley is Lecturer in French at the University of Strathclyde.